

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

EUCA 62-968

TO : Chief of Base, Salzburg (ATTN [])	CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL
FROM : Chief, KUCLUB; Chief, BE Chief of Station, Vienna Chief, NATCA		
FROM : Chief, EUCA <i>EAC</i>	DATE	14 SEPTEMBER 1962
SUBJECT : Operational/GRCBOARD GRBLAMED-31 Communications Training Report		REF ID: A62-968-140962
ATTACHMENTS		MARKED FOR INFORMATION NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED AG. RISK ONLY

REMARKS

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1. GRBLAMED-31 was available for two days of communications refresher training in Munich on the afternoon of 25 August, 26 August, and the morning of 27 August 1962. [] and met at a pre-arranged location at 1300 hours on the 25th and then proceeded to a safe-apartment in the McGraw Kaserne area where GRBLAMED-31 was met and the W/T training conducted. The communications training period was reduced because of a week of U/W and G/W training given by the 10th Special Forces in the vicinity of Bad Toelz immediately preceding. GRBLAMED-31 left Munich via train at approximately 1315 hours on 27 August.

2. The last communications training for GRBLAMED-31 was held in August 1961. Since he had been unable to practice code for several months, GRBLAMED-31 spent quite a lot of time on the afternoon and evening of the first day and morning of the second copying code from a 12 LGPM training tape on the tape recorder.

3. LTRIZIK, a BYCIMK/U training signal plan, was activated on 25 August for the duration of GRBLAMED-31's training. The broadcast portion, activated initially, consisted of an UTTT message broadcast at a speed of 10 LGPM at 1510Z on the 25th. The Agent was unable to get enough of the broadcast, because of his long absence from code and difficult reception conditions due to fading, to enable him to obtain his UTTT indicators. This message was re-broadcast at a schedule on the morning of the 26th; however, and, after his concentrated code practice the previous day, GRBLAMED-31 was able to receive the message at this latter time. He required some help from the Training Officer in translating the deciphered text and in working out a couple of garbles. A broadcast on the 27th of August was copied and deciphered by the Agent without difficulty.

4. The contact portion of LTRIZIK was activated at 1215Z on 26 August. Five two-way contacts were attempted with the LINBER Base station during the training period. Of these, four were successful with the Agent passing four messages totaling 106 groups to the Base and receiving three messages totaling 98 groups. The Base station operators's contact reports rated GRBLAMED-31's sending as "Good". Some minor discrepancies in his use of GROPI procedure were noted, such as using "QRV" in the place of "QSV" and failing to terminate one of the contacts with "VA" until it was brought to his attention. All messages transmitted by GRBLAMED-31 were enciphered in his primary system, correctly using his cryptographic security check and confirmation letter in the process.

5. In addition to reviewing GRBLAMED-31 in his operational systems and procedures, his emergency cryptographic system, KOURTE/11 was canceled during the course of the training session. GRBLAMED-31 was whole-heartedly in favor of cancellation of this memory system and replacing it with a cache of "FR" pads, to be used only in the event of compromise or non-availability of his primary system pads.

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10-67
100USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
SI-20, SI-20A AND SI-20
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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